

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----121742 262234Z /61  
O 262213Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5149  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 11013

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, EG, IS, US  
SUBJECT: PRE-CAMP DAVID CONSULTATIONS WITH ISRAELIS

REF: A) STATE 213798, B) STATE 215852

1. HAD PRE-DEPARTURE PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AT HIS RESIDENCE SATURDAY EVENING, AUGUST 26, FOR APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES. HE WAS RELAXED, JOVIAL, AND SELF-CONFIDENT, LOOKING FORWARD WITH KEEN ANTICIPATION TO UNIQUE EXPERIENCE AT SUMMIT DIPLOMACY WHICH LIES AHEAD. BEGIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FULL WELL IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING SUCCESS AT CAMP DAVID, NOT ONLY FOR FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND FUTURE PEACE IN THE REGION, BUT ALSO TO PROTECT PRESIDENT CARTER'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AS A STATESMAN WHICH IS OF SUCH CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO "FREE WORLD."

2. BEGIN HAD READ TRANSCRIPT OF MY LONG MEETING YESTERDAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN THINKING OVER SOME OF THE SUBJECTS WE HAD DISCUSSED AND THE REPORTS HE HAD HAD FROM AMBASSADOR DINITZ ON HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS. HE WANTED TO SHARE WITH ME AND ASKED ME TO SHARE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
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AND THE SECRETARY SOME REACTIONS, CAUTIONING ME THAT THESE VIEWS DID NOT IN ALL CASES HAVE FULL GOI CABINET APPROVAL AS YET. (CABINET MEETING TOMORROW WILL MAKE "FINAL DECISIONS" WITH RESPECT TO CAMP DAVID PREPARATIONS.)

3. BEGIN SAID THAT IN HIS MIND "FULL SUCCESS" AT CAMP DAVID WOULD INVOLVE SOME SORT OF FORMAL AGREEMENT ON MAJOR

ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM PLUS AGREEMENT TO A CONTINUING NEGOTIATING PROCESS AFTER CAMP DAVID. "PARTIAL SUCCESS WOULD BE ACHIEVED IF AT LEAST A CONTINUING NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS PUT IN PLACE." HE STRESSED THAT HE COULD SEE NO WAY OF REACHING FULL SUCCESS ON THE COMPLEX ISSUES AT HAND WITHOUT A PROLONGED AND CONTINUOUS, ALMOST DAILY, NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WOULD EXTEND FOR PERHAPS SOME MONTHS. HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THIS CONCEPT BE GOTTEN ACROSS TO SADAT BY PRESIDENT CARTER; HE HAD TRIED TO EXPLAIN IT AT THEIR EARLIER MEETING IN ISMAILIA BUT OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT SUCCEEDED.

4. THINKING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSURING THAT CAMP DAVID ACHIEVE AS A MINIMUM WHAT HE DEFINED AS "PARTIAL SUCCESS," AND VITAL IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING FOR ALL CONCERNED A FAILURE, BEGIN SAID HE WAS GOING TO SUGGEST SOMETHING TO THE PRESIDENT DURING THEIR INITIAL CONVERSATION. HE WILL SUGGEST THAT AT THE FIRST TRIPARTITE MEETINGS THE PRESIDENT PROPOSE TO BOTH SADAT AND BEGIN THAT THEY AGREE AT THE OUTSET TO SET UP A CONTINUING NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK WHEN CAMP DAVID ENDS TO NEGOTIATE ON ALL ISSUES UNTIL FINAL AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED. THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK COULD BE IN THE FORM OF ONE, TWO OR MORE CONTINUING COMMITTEES AT THE WORKING LEVEL, TO MEET ANYWHERE MUTUALLY AGREEABLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE, OR ELSEWHERE. IF THE PRESIDENT PREFERRED, BEGIN HIMSELF COULD MAKE THIS  
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PROPOSAL AT THE FIRST TRIPARTITE MEETING. IN EITHER CASE, HE OF COURSE WOULD AGREE. IF SADAT ALSO AGREED, THEN THE CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE AUTOMATICALLY ACHIEVED AT LEAST PARTIAL SUCCESS AT THE OUTSET, AND THIS WOULD ALSO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS AND THE ATMOSPHERE FOR ALL OF THE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WHICH WOULD ENSUE DURING THE CAMP DAVID MEETINGS. BEGIN SAID THAT THIS IDEA HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED AND UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED IN LAST SUNDAY'S CABINET MEETING. HE HOPED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD THINK IT PROMISING.

5. NEXT BEGIN SAID HE WANTED TO CLARIFY WHAT HE HAD MEANT WHEN HE HAD SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF "PERMANENT PARTIAL AGREEMENTS." HE INSISTED THAT THE IDEA HAD ONLY ARISEN AFTER SADAT HAD SUGGESTED TO WEIZMAN THE "EL-ARISH GESTURE." HE THOUGHT OF A PERMANENT PARTIAL AGREEMENT AS EMBODYING AN APPROPRIATE QUID PRO QUO FOR RELINQUISHING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TO EGYPT OVER EL-ARISH AND SANTA CATARINA. HE CLAIMED HE WAS NOT THINKING OF ANYTHING LIKE INTERIM AGREEMENTS OR MORE BROAD PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL PLANS, SINCE HE WAS CONVINCED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE

TREATY. HE HAD IN HIS OWN MIND THOUGHT OF REACHING A PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT WITH SADAT OVER THE FUTURE OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN RAFAH AS AN APPROPRIATE QUID PRO QUO AND ONE WHICH WOULD TAKE THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE THEN OUT OF CONTENTION IN THE SUBSEQUENT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. BEGIN SAID AGAIN, AS HE HAS TO ME OFTEN IN THE PAST, THAT NO POLITICAL GROUP IN ISRAEL OF ANY SIZE WILL EVER AGREE TO DISMANTLE THE SETTLEMENTS SINCE IT WAS "UNNATURAL" TO

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5150  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

THINK OF A FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITH NOTHING TO SHOW FOR IT, HE THOUGHT THAT SOMETHING ALONG THIS LINE WOULD BE A PERFECTLY "NATURAL EXCHANGE." IN ANY EVENT, IF SADAT IS NOT INTERESTED IN SUCH PARTIAL AGREEMENTS HE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT PURSUE IT. HE CLAIMED AGAIN THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE RAISED THE SUBJECT IF THE EL-ARISH "REQUEST" HAD NOT BEEN PUT TO WEIZMAN.

6. BEGIN THEN TURNED TO A SUBJECT WHICH HE SAID HE HAD HEARD ECHOES OF RECENTLY FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH BRZEZINSKI AND QUANDT; THAT IS THE IDEA OF STATIONING OF U.S. FORCES IN THIS REGION AS A POSSIBLE COMPONENT OF AN AGREEMENT. HE SAID HE WANTED US TO KNOW CLEARLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY THAT IF THE U.S. WISHED TO TAKE OVER A BASE IN SINAI, ISRAEL WOULD IMMEDIATELY AGREE, AND THIS POSITION HAS FULL CABINET APPROVAL. IF THE SIXTH FLEET WISHED FACILITIES AT HAIFA OF ANY SORT, HE AND DAYAN WILL SUPPORT THE REQUEST AND HE IS CONFIDENT THE CABINET WOULD ALSO APPROVE IN A SIMILAR FASHION. THE LOGICAL COROLLARY OF EITHER OF THESE STEPS WOULD BE THE SIGNATURE OF A MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID, IF WE ARE ASKED TO ACCEPT THE STATIONING OF ANY FOREIGN FORCES IN JUDEA, SAMARIA OR SECRET

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GAZA, WHETHER U.S., UN OR ANYONE ELSE, THE GOI WOULD NOT AGREE. HE SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE PRESIDENT AT ONE OF THEIR MEETINGS WHY IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE OR POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO RELY ON OTHERS TO DEFEND THEIR BORDERS FOR THEM IN THE HEARTLAND OF ISRAEL. MOREOVER, HE SAID IT WOULD NOT BE POPULAR AT ALL IN THE U.S. TO PUT U.S. FORCES INTO SUCH A POSITION.

8. I CAUTIOUSLY INQUIRED WHETHER HE WAS EXCLUDING ANY POSSIBILITY OF JOINT FORCES WITH JORDAN OR EGYPT IN THE WEST BANK OR IN GAZA. HE PAUSED HESITANTLY AND THEN SAID THAT PERHAPS THIS CONCEPT MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED FOR SINAI, BUT NOT FOR THE WEST BANK OR FOR GAZA. I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO PURSUE THIS TOUCHY SUBJECT ANY FURTHER.

9. FINALLY, BEGIN SAID HE WANTED TO MENTION AN IDEA WHICH HAD RECENTLY COME TO HIM WHICH HAD NO OFFICIAL STATUS AS YET. IT CONCERNED THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEVOLVE AUTHORITY TO THE PALESTINIAN ADMINISTRATION COUNCIL UNDER THE SELF-RULE PLAN. THINKING IN TERMS OF A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, "WHICH MIGHT PERHAPS BE PROLONGED A YEAR OR TWO," PERHAPS ONE COULD DIVIDE THE PERIOD INTO TWO PARTS. IN THE INITIAL PORTION AUTHORITY WOULD FLOW FROM THE MILITARY GOVERNOR TO THE COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED. THEN IF THINGS WENT SMOOTHLY AND THERE HAD BEEN "A SUCCESSFUL TRIAL PERIOD WITH PEACE," PERHAPS THE MILITARY GOVERNOR HIMSELF COULD THEN BE ABOLISHED AND AUTHORITY HENCEFORTH FLOW ONLY FROM THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. BEGIN STRESSED AGAIN THAT THIS WAS ONLY AN IDEA AT THIS STAGE.

10. THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVERSATION WAS TAKEN UP WITH SECRET

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MY REVIEWING FOR HIM THE PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS PLAN FOR CAMP DAVID AS DESCRIBED IN STATE 217740. HE ASKED ME WHAT TIME ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 5 THE ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED. I SUGGESTED THIS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT NEXT WEEK BY THE ISRAELI ADVANCE TEAM. HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE AND HIS PARTY WOULD LEAVE ON SUNDAY

MORNING, SEPTEMBER 3, WOULD SPEND THE NIGHTS OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH AT THE REGENCY HOTEL IN NEW YORK, AND WOULD THEN FLY TO WASHINGTON THE AFTERNOON OF THE FIFTH. HE TOLD ME THAT MRS. WEIZMAN WILL BE ACCOMPANYING HER HUSBAND ALONG WITH MRS. BEGIN. HE IS STILL HOPING THAT THE MINISTERIAL PORTION OF HIS DELEGATION WILL INCLUDE YADIN, ALTHOUGH THIS DECISION WILL BE TAKEN BY THE CABINET TOMORROW. IN ANY EVENT, HE DEFINITELY WILL HAVE BOTH DAYAN AND WEIZMAN WITH HIM.

11. AS I WAS LEAVING BEGIN MENTIONED THAT HE WAS ALSO ABOUT TO DRIVE TO TEL AVIV TO DELIVER A SPEECH ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIETY FOR SOVIET JEWRY. I ONLY HALF JOKINGLY SUGGESTED THAT HE STAY OFF THE SUBJECT OF CAMP DAVID AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TONIGHT AND EVERY OTHER NIGHT BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER 5. HE SAID HE WOULD TRY.

12. COMMENT: BEGIN SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO CAMP DAVID WITH A BROAD ENOUGH GRANT OF AUTHORITY FROM THE CABINET TO DEAL WITH NEW PROBLEMS AND IDEAS AS THEY CAME UP, ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY FINAL AGREEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO CABINET APPROVAL SUBSEQUENTLY. HE WAS SEEMINGLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THESE HISTORIC MEETINGS WOULD GET THE PEACE PROCESS BACK TO WHERE IT HAD BEEN, HE THOUGHT, AT THE END OF THE ISMAILIA CONFERENCE LAST DECEMBER, AND HE SEEMED CURIOUSLY UNCONCERNED ABOUT ALL THAT HAD TRANSPIRED SINCE. IF HE HAS SOME STARTLING NEW IDEAS TO PROPOSE,

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THEY WERE CERTAINLY NOT IN EVIDENCE TONIGHT. LEWIS

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## Message Attributes

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